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Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings:
A Response to Posner and Sunsteint
RUSSELL KOROBKIN*
INTRODUCTION
Ranking things-from restaurants, to retirement communities, to attractive
celebrities-seems to be a peculiarly American preoccupation. Faculty and students are
no exception; within the academy, educational rankings are a common source of
discussion and debate. This is perhaps even more so in law schools than in most other
academic departments, as the Association of American Law Schools and law school
deans regularly protest the publication of law school rankings, especially those
compiled by U.S. News & WorldReport ("U.S. News").' Surprisingly, however, given
the amount of interest in the topic, the discussions and debates tend to be drawn quite
narrowly. The common implicit assumption in such debates is that educational
rankings ought to reflect educational quality. Disagreement usually centers around
whether educational quality is possible to measure and if so, how best to do so.
2
Articles prepared by Judge Richard Posner3 and Professor Cass Sunstein4 for this
symposium on The Next Generation of Law School Rankings offer useful insights
within the parameters of the conventional rankings debate, but they fail to break free
from its implicit boundaries. In this response to these articles, I first address the
authors' contributions within the framework in which they are situated. I then go on to
argue for an expanded vision of the future of educational rankings-one that views
rankings as instrumentally useful to the purpose of encouraging socially beneficial
competition among educational institutions. When designing rankings, the primary goal
should be to harness this positive power.
I. POSNER AND SUNSTEIN
Both Judge Posner and Professor Sunstein propose normative approaches to ranking
law schools, implicitly or explicitly using the U.S. News rankings methodology as their
point of departure. Judge Posner begins by claiming that some of the variables that
t Copyright 2006, Russell Korobkin. All rights reserved
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. The deans of nearly all accredited law schools are signatories of a letter posted on the
Law School Admission Council's website that calls ranking methodologies, such as those of
U.S. News, "inherently flawed." LAW ScHooL DEANS SPEAK OUT ABOUT RANKINGS (Law School
Admission Council 2005), available at http://www.lsac.org/ pdfs/2005-2006/RANKING2005-
newer.pdf [hereinafter DEANs SPEAK OUT].
2. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapaport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News and World
Report Shouldn't Want to be Compared to Time andNewsweek--or The New Yorker, 60 O1HO
ST. L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1999) (arguing that factors measured by U.S. News are not "good
indicator[s] of quality" (emphasis in original)).
3. Richard A. Posner, Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 13 (2006).
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test?, 81 IND. L.J. 25 (2006).
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U.S. News uses to measure law school quality are not of value to law students and that
the weights assigned to the various factors by the magazine are arbitrary 5-familiar
criticisms, to be sure.6 Posner then puts together a set of measurements he believes
better reflect educational quality from the perspective of potential students-Law
School Admission Test (LSAT) scores of a school's students, job placement rates,
clerkship placement rates, and business law faculty quality.7 He then ranks the top
forty-five law schools according to this methodology.
8
A few schools move up and a few move down in Posner's rankings as compared to
US. News, and although this will no doubt be of interest to the students and faculty of
those institutions, the finding of broader interest is that the differences in outcomes
between the Posner and the US. News approaches are relatively minor. These minor
differences occur because, as Posner explains, many of the variables utilized in his
approach and the US. News approach are highly correlated with one another. 9 In fact,
Posner finds that US. News's complicated mathematical formula that utilizes many
factors does not produce significantly different results than would a ranking of schools
on the basis of mean or dispersed student LSAT scores,' 0 a statistic that Posner
believes is relevant to student choices.' 1 In the end, Posner thus concludes that the US.
News rankings, while far from perfect, are essentially adequate for the purposes of
prospective students (as he sees their purposes), at least for the goal of narrowing down
their lists of prospective institutions. 12 Once the list is whittled to a particular tier of
schools, Posner believes that students must make an individualized investigation into
the relative merits of those schools and that no general ranking system can be very
useful in doing that-his included.
13
What I take to be the most important conclusion of Posner's exercise-that various
plausible measures of school quality are sufficiently correlated so that we need not
worry excessively about what measures are used-does not dissuade me from
quibbling with one of the measures that Posner includes in his normative approach.
Specifically, his decision to exclude an assessment of the quality of faculty scholarship
in general from his ranking approach while including an assessment of the quality of
scholarship in the area of business law seems difficult to defend. His two justifications
are (1) that most faculty scholarship, concentrated in esoteric areas where few lawyers
actually practice, is not of interest to the great majority of law students' 4 and, (2) that
business-law scholarship is probably a good proxy for the quality of education that
students receive in business law, which is the area in which most will eventually
practice. 15
5. Posner, supra note 3, at 13-14.
6. See, e.g., DEANS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Posner, supra note 3, at 18-20 tbl.3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id. at24.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id.
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Posner's two justifications are not equivalent, however, and taken together they do
not provide a convincing rationale for taking into account in rankings the scholarship
of a school's business-law faculty alone. If faculty scholarship in constitutional law, for
example, is of little interest to students, it is probably the case that business-law
scholarship itself is of little interest to students, even those who plan to practice
business law. More to the point though, even assuming that scholarship does have
value to students who plan to practice in a particular field, such scholarship is a public
good-a point to which I will return later-and students everywhere can benefit from
the scholarship of any school's scholars. One does not have to attend the University of
Chicago Law School to read Judge Posner's work in law and economics, for example,
or to learn from a professor who has read Judge Posner's work.
If the quality of faculty scholarship is relevant to students' choices of where to
matriculate, it must be because there is a correlation between the quality of a
professor's scholarship and quality of her teaching. If there is such a correlation, then
the quality of faculty scholarship in constitutional law must matter as much as the
quality of faculty scholarship in business law, unless we believe that all legal education
outside of courses specifically related to one's future area of practice is a complete
waste of time (in which case, huge curricular overhauls are called for at virtually all
law schools). I don't believe this, and I doubt that Judge Posner does either. If a
school's faculty scholarship creates little private value for students attending that
school, then it follows that evaluations of scholarship should not play a role in rankings
designed, as Posner's are, for the purpose of helping consumers to make purchase
decisions. If doing scholarship informs and enhances teaching, which in turn benefits
students, then evaluations of scholarship should be a part of such rankings. But under
neither set of assumptions would the consideration of scholarship related to only one
area of the curriculum be justified.
While Judge Posner implicitly assumes rankings systems should aggregate specific
pieces of information relevant to consumers, Professor Sunstein proposes that law
school rankings reflect the choices that past applicants have made. If Posner's
approach, like that of U.S. News, is modeled on Consumer Reports magazine,
Sunstein's approach, a revealed-preference ranking, is the equivalent of basing product
rankings on sales receipts. Sunstein's starting assumption is that, because choosing
where one spends three years obtaining one's professional education is a very
important decision, students will acquire "a great deal of information about the various
options," and therefore, "we have a strong presumptive reason to believe that their
choices are correct., 16 That is, we have a strong reason to believe that students'
decisions maximize their subjective expected utility. From here, Sunstein reasons that
rankings would most accurately aggregate and properly weight the information about
educational institutions that is relevant to potential students if they aggregate the
choices that students have already made. 17 Sunstein does not specify how exactly such
a revealed-preference ranking system would be implemented, but the basic idea is that
a school's score would increase each time students chose that school over comparable
schools.
16. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 27.
17. Id. at 28-29.
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Sunstein thoughtfully acknowledges a number of possible concerns with the
revealed-preference approach.18 I will not belabor each of these here, but I would like
to focus attention on one of his concerns that I think should not be a concern and one
concern that I have with his approach that I think he underappreciates.
Sunstein lists as a drawback of the revealed-preference approach the fact that
student choices might reflect factors other than educational quality per se, including,
principally, school location and cost. 9 That is, prospective students might choose, and
revealed-preference rankings would therefore reflect, a school's desirable location or
relatively inexpensive tuition. But to the extent that a school's environment and cost
are the same for all matriculating students, the fact that a revealed-preference ranking
would incorporate these factors seems to be a benefit rather than a drawback of the
approach. Sunstein's approach implicitly assumes that the purpose of rankings is to
help students make utility-maximizing matriculation decisions. Since location and cost,
along with educational quality, are relevant factors in the matriculation decision,
rankings are more useful if they incorporate these factors-and weight them in the way
that most students do-than if they do not incorporate these factors. Sunstein observes
that rankings that implicitly incorporate such factors can be misleading if used as a
"heuristic for overall quality." 20 This is true enough, but they will not be misleading if
used as an approximation of overall desirability.
One might argue that rankings that implicitly aggregate preferences for variables
like location are less useful to consumers than those that take into account only
educational quality because location preferences are heterogeneous. Therefore, if a
school's high ranking is location driven, the information might be useless or even
potentially misleading to many would-be applicants. This is a potential problem, but it
is equally true that consumer preferences for various factors that are seen as indicia of
educational quality are also heterogeneous. A robust clinical program, a strong
intellectual property faculty, or an excellent track record in placing students in
clerkships, for example, would be important quality measures to some students but not
to others; just as some students would prefer the energy of New York City and others
would prefer the climate of southern California.
Along with the claim that market choices aggregate more relevant information than
a consumer reports-type ranking system, Sunstein counts as a benefit of the revealed-
preference approach that it reduces the incentive for schools to adjust their behavior
merely to improve their rankings.2' Of this, I am skeptical. The perverse incentive
effects created by consumer reports-style rankings are well known. 22 Sunstein refers to
the following one briefly: if admissions selectivity is a criterion in the rankings
methodology, schools have an incentive to increase applications, even from
uncompetitive applicants, simply to appear more selective. 23 Although Sunstein might
be correct that it will be harder for schools to manipulate their scores in a revealed-
18. See id. at 29-33
19. Id. at 30-31.
20. Id. at31.
21. Id. at34.
22. For a description of positively shameful tactics that some law schools employ in an
effort to enhance their US. News rankings, see Dale Whitman, Doing the Right Thing, ASS'N
AM. LAW ScHs. NEWSL. (Ass'n Am. Law Schs., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2002, at 1-5.
23. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 28.
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preference ranking than in a consumer reports-type ranking, the revealed-preference
approach would undoubtedly create the same type of incentives for pernicious
behavior.
For example, if schools are judged on the basis of their success in head-to-head
competition for applicants with other schools, a school can improve its ranking by
offering admission to students whom the school has reason to believe will choose it
over the competition. This might suggest favoring applications from local students,
non-local students who indicate a specific tie to the location of the school, or students
who will commit to attending the school if accepted. If a revealed-preference approach
to rankings were to become dominant, I would expect to see many law schools
implement an "early decision" type of admissions program that has become common
among many elite undergraduate institutions and (rightly) criticized for its distorting
effects on application and matriculation decisions.
24
To see how tactics could be expected to pay benefits, one must look no further than
the model on which Sunstein relies for his revealed-preference proposal. This
methodology, as applied to undergraduate institutions by Christopher Avery and his
colleagues in a recent paper,25 leads to a ranking that places Notre Dame above
Swarthmore, Cornell, the University of Chicago, and the University of Michigan. 26 AS
Sunstein notes gingerly, it is sensible to attribute Notre Dame's high ranking to its
"particularly enthusiastic applicant pool, intensely drawn to the institution because of
its distinctive characteristics." 27 More generally, the problem is that the application and
admissions processes produce a non-random set ofhead-to-head competitions between
institutions that students face, and the lack of randomness can lead to systematic biases.
To understand the problem that most likely explains the ranking of Notre Dame,
assume the following:
1. 90% of students who could be admitted to Colleges A and B would
prefer A, while 10% would prefer B.
2. Of the 90% of students who would prefer A, only a few also apply to
B.
3. Of the 10% of students who would prefer B, most apply to both A and
B.
24. For discussions of how early admissions programs undermine student choice, see Karen
W. Arenson, Early Admissions Are Rising as Colleges Debate Practice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2002, at Al 8; Karen W. Arenson, Youths Seeking Early College Entry Are More Likely to Get
In, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at A12. Public pressure generated as a result of the
perverse incentives that such programs create has recently caused some elite institutions to end
them. See Karen W. Arenson, Change on Early Admission Procedures Produces Application
Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at A27; David Leonhardt, As Wealthy Fill Top Colleges,
Concerns Grow Over Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at Al; Tamar Lewin, Harvard
Adopts New Rules for Early-Admission Applicants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at A2 1.
25. Christopher Avery, Mark Glickman, Caroline Hoxby & Andrew Metrick, A Revealed
Preference Ranking of US. Colleges and Universities (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10803, Sept. 2004), available at www.nber.org/papers/wl0803.
26. Id. at 26 tbl.3.
27. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 29.
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As a result, A is actually preferred by most students, yet B will achieve the highest
rating in a revealed-preference comparison because B wins a large majority of the
head-to-head competitions with A.
As long as A and B do not care, this anomaly will have no pernicious effects. But if,
as a result, B achieves a higher ranking and A suffers a loss of prestige, A might stop
admitting qualified students who it believes are of the type who also would apply to B,
and B might begin favoring the type of applicants who are likely to apply to A as a
backup choice. If it turns out to be too difficult for schools to identify ex ante which
students would choose them over competitor institutions, they might try ex post to buy
students who hold a fist full of acceptance letters by targeting scholarships at the
students who will aid the school's standing in the rankings rather than those who the
school feels are the most deserving (based on academic merit, financial need, or any
other plausible measure of dessert), just as colleges currently attempt to bolster their
standing in rankings by targeting their financial aid recipients specifically to improve
their mean SAT score.28
II. A BROADER VIEW OF RANKINGS
The specific criticisms that I have made of Posner's and Sunstein's articles are
relatively minor. Both papers make useful contributions to the law school rankings
debate within what I see as the dominant rankings paradigm. In my view, this paradigm
is defined by two unstated assumptions: (1) that students use rankings as a mechanism
that aggregates information that is itself relevant to the quality of education, and (2)
that rankings ought, therefore, to reflect the quality of legal education. Posner's article
tells us that the precise measures of quality that rankings studies use matter relatively
little; Sunstein points out that a rankings approach that aggregates market choices can
provide a different and perhaps more complete measure of quality than approaches that
aggregate and weight objective, factual information.
My primary argument is not a criticism of Posner's and Sunstein's articles per se,
but is addressed more broadly to the dominant paradigm that assumes rankings should
reflect, directly or indirectly, the quality of education offered by the institutions that are
ranked. My hope is that my critique will lead others to think more broadly about the
uses of rankings beyond the relatively narrow confines of the usual debate-
specifically, about the positive power of rankings and how to harness it.
A. Rankings as a Commodity: The Competition for Status
As a point of departure, it is important to recognize that consumers view educational
rankings not merely as an aggregate measurement of value, but as valuable in and of
themselves. Put differently, for many students at least, school rankings-separate from
objective information the rankings might reflect in the aggregate-are endogenous to
matriculation choice.
Judge Posner's article calls it "odd" that the ranking of law schools in US. News
would be a significant factor in the matriculation choices of law students because the
28. See Robert H. Frank, The Intense Competition for Students is Threatening Financial
Aid Based on Need, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C2.
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choice of a law school is so significant that it is cost-justified for every applicant to
create his own composite ranking of schools, including the information relevant to his
individual utility function.29 If the only purpose of rankings were to aggregate
information and if consumers have different utility functions (as they surely do), Posner
would be correct to expect that consumers would rely on rankings only for relatively
unimportant decisions that do not justify the investment in an individualized cost-
benefit analysis. Posner's analysis is not correct, however, if students place a high
value on the school's rank for its own sake. If the rank is valued, it is not at all
surprising to observe that many students pay quite close attention to the U.S. News
hierarchy even though the importance of the matriculation decision justifies an
individualized cost-benefit analysis.
That students are concerned with rankings themselves, rather than merely with the
underlying information reflected in rankings, highlights an important difference
between educational rankings and rankings of other products, such as what you might
find in Consumer Reports magazine. In education, rather than charging market-clearing
price and allocating supply on the basis of willingness to pay, most institutions are
selective about their customers. 30 Some material purchases have a status component, to
be sure, but the status comes only from demonstrating that one has enough money to
afford the item, such as a luxury car or a Rolex watch. The purchase of education has a
different and significant status component, however, because it signals that the
customer demonstrated enough intellectual acumen and achievement to be selected by
the school at which he matriculated. Status achieved through selection by an
educational institution, students might rightly assume, can be translated not only into
esteem and ego gratification in the way of a Mercedes Benz, but also into an increased
breadth of employment opportunities and greater long-term earning potential.
B. The Need for Coordination Mechanisms
Since status derived from one's affiliation with an educational institution comes
from its exclusivity, students achieve status by choosing a school at which gaining
admission is difficult. The school's acceptance rate is a poor measure of this because
the school might receive applications from many low-quality students. 31 Standardized
test score averages are a somewhat better measure of a school's selectivity, but schools
consider a range of factors, not just standardized test scores, and few employers believe
that such test scores alone are good predictors of success in the workplace (although
they might be). If this were not true, we would expect college graduates to place their
29. Posner, supra note 3, at 13; accord Rapoport, supra note 2, at 1100 ("[R]ankings aren't
really necessary, because all of the raw information that might be useful to prospective students
is available in an easily accessible format.").
30. For a thoughtful analysis of why law schools would want to discriminate amongst
applicants based on their quality, see Jay Conison, Financial Management of the Law School.
Costs, Resources, and Competition, 34 UNIv. TOL. L. REv. 37 (2002).
31. For a more detailed analysis of why acceptance rates and matriculation rates are both
poor proxies for student quality, see David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings are Harmful
Deceptions: A Response to Those Who Praise the Rankings and Suggestions for a Better
Approach to Evaluating Law Schools, 40 Hous. L. REv. 419,432-37 (2003).
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SAT scores prominently on their resumes and law school graduates to do the same with
their LSAT scores, although I have heard few reports of either.
The best way for a student to signal his high quality to the employment market is to
matriculate at a school where only high-quality students can gain admission. 32 The
school thus serves as a gatekeeper, certifying that the student satisfies the school's
difficult entrance requirements, and employers rely on this certification, at least in part,
when allocating desirable job opportunities. 33 In a world in which there is an ever-
increasing disparity between the intellectual and pecuniary rewards offered by the most
desirable jobs and all other jobs, this certification is more important than ever.
This state of affairs creates a coordination problem for students. The top-quality
students want to attend an institution that the other top-quality students wish to attend.
Students of slightly lower quality wish to attend that same group of schools as well
because if they do, employers will perceive them as part of the top-quality group. If
these students are unsuccessful at gaining admittance to that group of schools, their
second choice will be schools where the other nearly top-quality students can be found.
And so on down the line. Each cadre of students wants to send the best possible signal
of quality, and all students best satisfy this goal by attending a school chosen by the
highest-quality group of students to which they can gain admittance.34
The problem is, without the ability to communicate among themselves ex ante,
where do students go to associate with students of similar (or, hopefully, even better)
quality and thus signal their merit to employers? Students need a prominent,
conspicuous focal point around which to coordinate their actions.35
If you could win a prize by meeting up with a particular stranger at a set time in
Paris, you would be wise to go to the Eiffel Tower because it is the most obvious point
of coordination. If you can earn job-market currency by attending the same law school
as the "best" students and you have no way of making a joint matriculation decision
with such students, where should you go? Just as the Eiffel Tower is the obvious
coordination spot in Paris, the top-ranked law school (or, at a minimum, the top-ranked
law school in your region) in the most notable set of rankings is the most obvious
coordination location for top-quality students. Notice that the school that you would
choose if you followed my advice will not necessarily provide you with the highest
32. Cf Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report Law School Rankings are
Both Useful and Important, 51 J. LEGAL EDuc. 487,492-93 (2001) (describing how law firms
use law school rankings as a method of determining where to interview job candidates and
which candidates to hire); Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to
Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REv. 403, 411-14 (1998) (finding a
correlation between the US. News ranking tier and the number of law firms conducting on-
campus interviews).
33. See Frank, supra note 28 (noting that competition for the elite post-college jobs is
fierce, and employers often consider only applicants graduating from elite institutions).
34. See also Korobkin, supra note 32, at 407-14. One author has criticized my earlier
defense of rankings as a coordination mechanism by claiming this function is only useful to
"elite students" who need to choose between elite law schools. See Thomas, supra note 31, at
449-50. This criticism is misguided. All students, except perhaps the very worst, want to send as
positive a signal of their quality as is possible, and they can do this by coordinating their
matriculation decisions with students of equal or better quality.
35. Cf THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-58 (1960) (discussing the
problem of tacit coordination among people with common interests).
[Vol. 81:35
POSITIVE POWER OF RANKINGS
quality education or the most enjoyable three years, just as the Eiffel Tower is not
necessarily the most intriguing tourist attraction in Paris.
If I am correct about why students value rankings, at least primarily, and if
educational institutions value high rankings as well-because high rankings attract top
students, top faculty, more alumni dollars, or for any other reason or combination of
reasons-the purveyor of rankings has a whole new world of opportunities. Rankings
need not attempt to measure the quality of the education offered by the institution
because, regardless, students will continue to seek out highly ranked schools and
schools will continue to compete for high rankings.
This broad claim is subject to some limitation, to be sure, because when students
select a law school they presumably do not value only the status that attending a highly
ranked law school conveys-they also want a good education and an enjoyable
experience. So if the highest-ranked law schools were known for having uniformly
unqualified professors and abysmally low bar-passage rates, and if they held classes in
portable trailers in Minot, North Dakota, my prediction is that they would not serve as
a coordination point for the best students. In order to maximize overall utility, students
would have to ignore the rankings and attempt to identify some other less precise
means of coordination. But as long as most schools are perceived as meeting a
threshold level of educational quality and environmental amenities, which is essentially
guaranteed by ABA accreditation requirements 36 and the strong demand among smart
lawyers for jobs as law professors, students will use rankings as coordination
mechanisms even if they are based largely or even entirely on factors not directly
related to educational quality.
Sunstein points out that schools will seek the status that a high ranking provides and
thus will adjust their behavior solely for the purpose of gaining a higher ranking.37 And
he is not alone. Jeffrey Stake's contribution to this symposium, for example, is devoted
almost entirely to this topic. 38 This is undoubtedly true, but whereas Sunstein and Stake
see the competition for status as a necessarily pernicious by-product of rankings that
should be minimized-recall that one of Sunstein's primary justifications for a
revealed-preference ranking methodology is the claim that it is harder to game than
other methodologies 39 -I see it as presenting an exciting opportunity. Rather than
devising a rankings system that makes the inevitable attempts to game the system more
costly for educational institutions, we should devise a rankings system that channels
competition in a way that encourages the production of social benefits that exceed
social costs. The problem with a rankings methodology that rewards schools for taking
steps such as increasing the applications of low-quality students in order to make the
school appear more selective is not the general fact that rankings cause schools to act
in ways that they would not in the absence of status competition. The problem is that
the specific type of competitive behavior that such methodologies encourage is socially
36. See generally Michael Ariens, Law School Banding and the Future ofLegal Education,
34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 301, 309-14 (2003) (chronicling the role of ABA accreditation requirements
in creating widespread uniformity in legal education).
37. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 28.
38. See Jeffirey E. Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and
Resource Allocation, 81 IND. L.J. 229 (2006).
39. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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wasteful, not to mention inherently dishonest: the marginal students that are now
induced to apply must expend new resources to do so, and no one is benefited.
C. Status Competition and Social Welfare
Our task, then, should not be to try to avoid status competition, but to channel the
competition into welfare-enhancing activities. How can we identify and promote status
competition that is socially efficient rather than inefficient? I offer two principles: First,
rankings should encourage the production of public goods because, by definition, these
are goods that would otherwise be under-produced relative to their social optimum as a
result of collective action problems. Second, these public goods should be of a type
that law schools have a particular competency to produce. Cleaning up litter on public
thoroughfares is a type of public good, but a rankings methodology that gave the
highest rating to law schools whose students and faculty engaged in the most hours of
street cleanup would be inefficient, relatively speaking, because law students and law
faculty are not uniquely suited for such an activity.
Given my two criteria, the most obvious candidate for channeling status competition
among educational institutions is some measure of the quality of faculty scholarship.
First, scholarship is either an entirely public good or a partially public good, depending
on whether scholarly work increases the quality of teaching. Second, faculty members
who teach a certain subject area are well suited to study and expound upon that subject
in writing for the benefit of students, other scholars, and, in the case of legal
scholarship, judges, policy makers, and practicing attorneys. There are, of course,
different ways to measure the quality of faculty scholarship, ranging from subjective
reputation surveys of experts4° to more objective measures such as citations,41 SSRN
"downloads, ' '42 or empirical publications in peer-reviewed journals, 43 all of which are
discussed in other contributions to this symposium as well as elsewhere. I will not
attempt to address the question of how best to operationalize the goal of evaluating
scholarship. My point is that by using rankings to encourage schools to compete to
produce quality scholarship, we can facilitate the production of a public good that we
otherwise would expect to be underproduced by the market and which educational
institutions are particularly competent to produce.
Should rankings of law schools be based entirely on measures of faculty
scholarship, following the lead of Brian Leiter's well-known rankings? 44 I think a
strong case can be made for this both because scholarship so nicely satisfies the two
requirements that I have laid out and also because ranking schools on a single factor,
40. See Brian Leiter, Commentary, How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 47, 58 (2006).
41. On the logic of using citation counts as a proxy for scholarly quality, see Russell
Korobkin, Ranking Journals: Some Thoughts on Theory and Methodology, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 851,864-70 (1999).
42. See Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRNto Measure
Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83, 112-120 (2006).
43. See Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top
Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006).
44. Leiter's most recent law school rankings are based on faculty scholarship and can be
found on his webpage. Leiter's Law School Rankings, http://www.leiterrankings.com (last
visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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even if the actual rankings are constructed by averaging several measures of that factor,
will ensure that schools will clearly focus on this competition. But a plausible case can
also be made for including faculty scholarship as just one of several variables in a
rankings methodology that takes account of other public goods within the realm of law
schools' institutional competence. For example, law schools might be rated according
to the legal services that their clinical programs provide to underserved communities
and/or the extent to which their students and faculty achieve legal reform through
litigation advocacy or participation in legislative reform efforts. Or, law schools might
be rated according to the per capita amount of pro bono legal service provided by
alumni of the institution. It is unclear whether the quality of teaching has a public good
aspect or whether its value is completely captured by students who receive it-this is a
topic that needs more careful consideration.45 But if we think that it does have a public
good aspect, this would suggest that educational institutions produce teaching quality
in insufficient quantity and, consequently, that including some measure of it in a
rankings methodology could enhance social welfare.
CONCLUSION
Members of the legal academy and the legal profession need to think beyond the
boundaries of the conventional rankings debate, which focuses on what measures best
reflect educational quality. Rankings have inherent value to students who use them for
coordination purposes and therefore to institutions that compete for students. This
means that rankings need not merely attempt to reflect the private value that an
institution provides its students; they can also be designed to encourage socially
advantageous competition among institutions.
If the legal academy and the profession could agree on how to best harness this
positive power of rankings, the specific methodology that would emerge could be the
basis for a set of rankings that would overtake U.S. News as the authoritative source.
However, agreement among the constituencies is critical. Without such agreement, two
equilibria are possible. First, a first-mover such as U.S. News could maintain its
dominance in the mind of prospective students because it is the established source of
coordination and no individual consumer can switch unless he is reasonably certain
most others will switch as well. Second, rankings could proliferate to the point at which
none is commonly agreed upon as being dominant or focal, in which case rankings
would lose their ability to serve a coordination function and, consequently, their ability
to stimulate competition among schools. Unfortunately, neither of these equilibria is
socially optimal.
45. See Korobkin, supra note 32, at 425-26 (arguing that teaching quality is a private
good).
2006]

